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SMART: A Secure Multipath Anonymous Routing Technique

Prateek Jain & Rupsha Bagchi
Manipal Institute of Technology, Manipal University, Manipal, 576104, Karnataka, India
E-mail : jainprateek_90@yahoo.com & rupsha.bagchi@gmail.com

Abstract - Multipath routing for mobile Ad hoc networks is a technique of concurrent management and utilization of multiple paths
for transmitting distributed data evenly across the nodes instead of routing all the traffic along a single path, potentially resulting in
longer lifetime along with the benefits of better transmission performance, fault tolerance, increased bandwidth and improved
security. In this paper, a secure multipath anonymous routing protocol (abbreviated as SMART) has been proposed. SMART uses
non cryptographic ways to help the source find the routes to the destination and dynamic onion routing to intimate the source about
these routes. It includes a mechanism of key caching and defines a minimum battery protection threshold for each node to help
increase the network lifetime to some extent. In effect SMART is an attempt to strike a balance between the anonymity, security and
energy consumption in a network.
Index Terms - Multipath routing, Dynamic onion routing, Key caching, Minimum threshold

I.

INTRODUCTION

Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) is a collection of
independent mobile nodes that can communicate to each
other via radio waves. These networks can work at any
place without the help of any infrastructure. The
dynamical nature of the network topology increases the
challenges of the design of routing protocols in such ad
hoc networks.
The nodes in these networks usually have a limited
storage and low computational capabilities. They
heavily depend on other nodes and resources for data
access and information processing. But MANETs are
much more vulnerable to attacks than wired network.
This is because of the reasons like open medium where
eavesdropping is easier than in wired network. Also
dynamically changing network topology, implying that
mobile nodes come and go from the network, may allow
any malicious node to join the network without being
detected. Thus, a reliable network topology must be
assured through efficient, secure and anonymous routing
protocols for these Ad Hoc networks. Routing strategies
play an important role in the minimization of energy
consumption during the data transmission.[1]Finding a
new route on path failure introduces delay along with
the possibility of the disclosure of the identity of the
source node to passive adversaries. As each radio
terminal in the network is usually powered by energy
limited power source, an energy efficient multipath

routing protocol can be used to overcome this problem.
Routing protocols for MANET can be classified as
proactive algorithms, reactive (on-demand) algorithms,
flow-oriented algorithms, and others. Multipath routing
establishes multiple paths between the sourcedestination pair. Classical multipath routing has been
explored for two reasons. The first for load balancing;
the traffic between the source and destination is split
across multiple disjoint paths. The second use is to
increase likelihood of reliable data delivery.
In this paper we describe SMART, which to the
best of our knowledge, is the first of its kind. It is an
efficient way in which we can achieve anonymity in
multipath routing along with economical utilization of
energy but at the same time compromising on the
latency factor to a certain extent. Rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section II has related work;
Section III describes the adversary models, our
assumptions, the essential idea of anonymous and secure
routing in SMART and the detailed implementation of
routing protocol. Section IV gives performance analysis
and Section V gives some concluding remarks on our
paper.
II.

RELATED WORK

In order to provide privacy and protection, plenty of
work about anonymous ad hoc routing protocol has been
researched. In ASR [3] nodes forwarding a RREQ
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message keep state information about this RREQ. Later
on, they use this state information to decide whether and
to whom they have to forward this RREQ. In ANODR
[4] each intermediate node adds sufficient information
to an onion that is copied by the destination into the
RREP message. Nodes can recognize RREP messages
they need to forward using this onion. In both [3] and
[4], for every RREQ message each intermediate node
generates a new public or secret key pair which helps in
providing anonymity. Some protocols like SDAR [5]
and MASK [6] partially violate the anonymity requisite
as they use real identities of participating nodes in order
to achieve improved performance. E.g. in [5] nodes use
real identities but they are encrypted and known only to
sender and receiver, which guarantees the anonymity of
intermediate nodes to observers but not to the sender
and receiver. In [5], it is assumed that the identity of
every node in a broadcast is in plaintext. Every
intermediate node has to perform a public key
decryption and encryption for every RREQ message it
forwards. This may lead to inundation of the network,
thereby resulting in congestion. [6] doesn’t use a
trapdoor unlike [4] but at the same time provides
conditional anonymity by exposing the destination’s
identifier in ARREQ in order to improve routing
efficiency. [6] relies on synchronization keys and
pseudonyms between nodes. These approaches require
all network nodes to perform expensive cryptographic
operation in the forward path (broadcasting RREQ
message), which results in wasting both computation
power and bandwidth, as only a few nodes will be
selected as forwarding nodes. ARM [8] improves upon
these by using a dynamic index as the index changes on
a per-request basis for shared key management and used
limited flooding instead of dummy traffic and local
mixing of messages to prevent traffic analysis.
CMMBCR [7], a hybrid energy saving protocol
considers residual energy of nodes as the metric for
route establishment to improve the lifetime of a node.
Although several proactive multipath algorithms have
been developed, they do not take conservation of power
into account and end up generating excessive overhead
due to their proactive nature. Their scheme also does not
offer any security since the identity of the node is
encompassed in its packets.

and establish a reliable and anonymous path that links
the two nodes. Both the route discovery and
establishment process should be carried out securely and
without jeopardizing the anonymity of the
communicating nodes. The process is divided into three
phases: the route request phase, the route reply phase
and the data transmission phase. Distributed
information gathering about intermediate nodes that can
be used along an anonymous path is carried out during
the route request phase, while passing this information
to the source node takes place during the route reply
phase. The official data exchange is processed during
the data transmission phase after the construction of the
route.
A. Adversary model
Adversaries in a network can be classified into two
categories. An external adversary is a wireless link
intruder that can intercept all traffic transmitted on all
the connections in the network. An internal adversary is
a node intruder that can compromise legitimate network
members. Both internal and external adversaries exist in
the network and rely on trapdoor instead of node
identities. Without knowing the node identities, the
adversary has no means to break a mobile node’s
identity. It is assumed that adversaries have unbounded
eavesdropping capability but bounded computation and
node intrusion capability, as in [6]. Anonymity of
network layer alone has been taken into consideration.
Attacks in application or physical layer are beyond the
scope of this paper.
B. Assumptions
The initial assumptions of [8] hold true for this
protocol as well, which are described subsequently. The
following assumptions have been made.
•

Each node in the network has a permanent unique
ID which is known by all other nodes in the
network.

•

The source Ns and the destination node Nd share a
secret key KSD and a secret pseudonym in RREQ
messages directed at the destination node.

•

Every node has established a broadcast key with its
one hop neighborhood which will be used to
encrypt the RREP messages. Wireless links
between the nodes are symmetric.

II. PROTOCOL
The main aim of the proposed routing protocol is to
improve upon drawbacks of the anonymous protocol
mentioned above, that is to accomplish anonymity, data
integrity and security along with reduced energy
consumption. It supports reliability by providing node
disjoint paths and provides stability by distributing the
burden of routing and congestion control. To send data
anonymously to a node, a sender node has to discover

To enhance the efficiency of our protocol, it has
also been assumed that nodes will only share secret keys
and pseudonyms with a limited set of other nodes. At
any point of time each node is aware of its residual
energy.
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C. Notations
Ni
KSD
Nmi,
Nmi+1
T
tdD
pubd/privd
(ns,ks)
h()
e_thresh

Node i, where Ns and Nd represent source
and destination nodes
Secret key shared by the source and the
destination
Two consecutive pseudonyms stored by the
destination. Nmi for current use and Nmi+1
for the next use.
Type of message:
0 = RREQ; 1=RREP; 2= data
Trapdoor descriptor for the destination node
Public keys/Private keys
Link identifiers
Hash function used
Minimum threshold energy defined for each
node

Table 1: Notations
D. Route Request
The route request phase allows a source node to
communicate with a node by discovering and
establishing routing paths to that node anonymously.
This is done using a number of intermediate nodes
between the source and destination. Route discovery is
triggered when a node wishes to communicate with
another node within its network. The source (S)
generates a new asymmetric key pair pubd/privd and a
secret key k. Next, it generates the trapdoor descriptor
tdD that can only be opened by the destination node (D)
which has knowledge of the secret key KSD:
tdD = KSD[D, k, privd], k[NmSD] .
The destination node recognizes its current
pseudonym Nmi and a secret key KSD is shared between
the source and the destination. The source now
generates a pair of link identifiers (ns, ks) and encrypts
them with the public key pubd. It finally constructs a
RREQ message in the following format, which is then
broadcast to the network.
In the route request phase, NmSD is included in
plaintext and the consecutive pseudonym NmSD+1 is
used to encrypt a trapdoor. Like NmSD, ME is also
included as plaintext. Upon receiving the RREQ
message, an intermediate node does the following
things:
•

Performs a search in its table (the table contains a
list of pseudonyms of various source nodes) to
check whether the message was meant for that
node. If the corresponding pseudonym is found, the
node may be the intended receiver and the next
identifier NmSD+1 at the node is then used to open
the trapdoor. If the first part of the decryption is not
equal to the unique identifier of the node then it is

not the destination and once again it broadcasts the
request packet. No cryptographic operations are
required for a node to be able to recognize whether
it is the required recipient.
•

If the intermediate node is not the targeted
destination then it checks whether NmSD is present
in its routing table. If it is, it discards the packet else
it stores (NmSD, ni, ki, k(NmSD)) in its routing table.

•

If the received packet has the value of time to live
field ttl>1, then the node decrements it, and
generates a random pair of link identifiers (ni, ki),
appends these to the already received encrypted link
identifiers, encrypts everything with pubD, and
broadcasts the following RREQ message :

RREQ :
[T=0,NmSD, tdD, ttl, pubd, ME, pubd(. . . (pubd(ni-1, ki-1),
ni, ki),padding]
•

If the received value in the ttl field is 1, the
intermediate node does not broadcast anything.

When an intermediate node broadcasts a RREQ
packet, it compares its residual energy with the value
present in the ME field. (The first node on the path
discovery puts its residual energy in the ME field which
is initialized to zero). If the residual energy of the node
is less than the value present in ME, then it updates this
field by writing its own energy value, else ME is left
undisturbed. It also adds other information as
mentioned along with random padding in the padding
field as per [8]. If the node is the targeted destination
then the RREQ packet is stored in its memory and it
broadcasts the packet yet again so as to protect its
identity. It looks like any normal intermediate node to a
passive adversary.
E. Route Reply
In order to conserve the energy of the nodes and to
increase the network lifetime to some extent, we use
multiple routes for data delivery and thus, send
information about these routes to the source in the route
reply phase. During route request the destination
receives a number of RREQ’s from the same source
through different routes which are node disjoint. It
stores each of these in its memory and compares the
value of the ME field with the e_thresh value defined. If
the difference between values in the ME field and
e_thresh is less than or equal to 1, then that path is
rejected. It is because one can conclude that a node on
that path is about to reach its threshold energy and die
soon as it is possibly being used by other nodes in the
network to forward their packets. What a node does
when its residual energy equals e_thresh is described in
section H.
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Where k1n = h(kn-1) where h is a hash function.
After the construction of the reply onions, node D
generates a random value for the time to live field and
unicasts them on the discovered routes. (NmSD is copied
from the RREQ message and again serves as a unique
identifier). The identifier and ttl field of the RREP
message are encrypted with the current broadcast key of
node D to hide them from a global passive adversary.

Figure 1: A part of the network with 9 nodes
depicting the RREQ packets that reach the destination
For example, in figure 1 there are 3 node disjoint
paths that the source can use to send data to the
destination. These paths are A-B-C-D(1), A-G-H-D(2)
and A-F-E-D(3). When the RREQ packets are
broadcasted from the source the ME field of these
packets consist of a value zero. The following tables
show the values of the ME fields of the RREQ packets
as they pass through different nodes.
Node

ME

Node

ME

Node

ME

A

0

A

0

A

0

B

30

G

35

F

40

C

3

H

35

E

25

(1)

(2)

(3)

Figure 2: The tables show the changing value of ME
field of the packets for paths 1,2 and 3.
The destination receives all these three RREQ
packets and stores them in its memory. It now compares
the ME field with e_thresh. Let for the above example
e_thresh is fixed at 2. When the destination finds that for
path 1 the difference between ME and e_thresh is 1 it
rejects that path for the reason mentioned above. Thus it
creates RREP for only two paths namely D-H-G-A and
D-E-F-A. It is assumed that there will always be at least
one path in which all the nodes have remaining energy
such that the difference of their energies and e_thresh is
greater than 1.
For each of the valid paths found the destination
decrypts the trapdoor identifier tdD and gets information
about k and privD. Using this privD it decrypts the link
identifiers present in the RREQ packet. After collecting
all such link identifiers of intermediate nodes, along
with (ns, ks), the destination creates a route reply onion
of the form:
Kn ( nn, k1n , k, kn-1(nn-1, k1n-1 , k, …ks(ns ,k)))

Each intermediate Node Ni which receives the
RREP strips one layer of the reply onion, puts a new
value in the time to live field and sends it to the next
node in the route after encrypting the present header
with its current broadcast key. Ni stores a pair of secret
keys (ki, h(ki)) in its routing table. These keys are shared
with the previous hop and the next hop respectively
where ki = h(ki-1). Padding is applied in the padding field
as in RREQ. Finally, these RREP’s reach the source
which it then stores in its memory. Thus, multiple node
disjoint paths are successfully established between the
source and the destination.
F. Data Transmission
Once the routes have been established, now the
source prepares to forward the data. Shamir’s modified
(k, n) threshold scheme used in [9] has been used to
maintain the security of the data being forwarded to the
destination. It states the following:
Assume that data D is a secret to be exchanged
between the source and destination. Then divide D into
n pieces D1,D2,....,Dn such that:
a)

With the knowledge of any k or more pieces, Di, D
can be computed easily.

b) The knowledge of less than k pieces will leave D
completely undetermined (in the sense that all its
possible values are equally likely).
c)

There is only a small possibility that any k-1
participants can fabricate new pieces D11,D12,...,D1kth
th
1 that deceive a k participant. Here deceiving k
participant means that from D11,D12,.....,D1k-1 and Dk
, the secret D1 reconstructed is legal but incorrect
(i.e. D1 is not equal to D).

The data is divided into n parts by the source node.
To do so, a polynomial of degree k-1 of the form given
below is required to be chosen.
q(x)=a0+a1 x+...+ak-1xk-1
in which a0=D and evaluate
D1 = q(1) . . . . . Di = q(i) . . . . . Dn = q(n).
Given any subset of k of these Di values, the
coefficients of q(x) can be found by interpolation. The
values D1, . . . Dn are computed modulo p where p is a
prime larger than both D and n.Thus, the data is divided
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into n parts. Source node sends each part to the
destination through n different routes which have
already been established in the route discovery phase. If
Di is long, it can be split up into shorter blocks of bits to
avoid multiprecision arithmetic operations as per
Shamir[10].
After the destination node receives k random
shares it can generate the entire data D by using
Lagrange’s interpolation( equation 1) and evaluate
D=q(0).
f(x)=h(x)=∑ki=1 f(ii)∏kl=1,l≠i((x-il)÷(ii-il)) mod p …. (1)
To make sure that there are no fake shares in the
reconstruction process, we assign each share an
unforgeable signature such as that proposed in [9].A
signature system is said to be strongly unforgeable if the
signature is existentially unforgeable and, given
signatures on some message M, the adversary cannot
produce a new signature on M. In order for that to
happen, computation of h(M) for the entire message M
is done initially. Each share x then, is of the form
Dx= (q(x), h(x), n)
If it is assumed that an adversary manages to get
hold of any k-1 shares then for every share Di it can
construct only a single polynomial of degree k-1 such
that q’(0)=D’ and q’(i) = Di for the given k-1 arguments.
By construction, the p possible polynomials are equally
likely to be generated which makes the discovery of the
real data impossible.
After receipt of k shares, the destination rebuilds
the data and recalculates the value of h(M) and
examines whether it matches that of the original. If it
does, then the shares are legitimate and so is the data.
Else it indicates that the shares have been tampered with
and there is an active attack going on. In this case the
data generated is discarded.
This protocol has two more features which
contribute in saving some energy given the
computations that need to be carried out for data
transmission. We use the concept of key caching and
minimum threshold energy which shall be discussed
about subsequently.
G. Key Caching
With regard to key caching, caching of the
following keys is done:
•

The key that the source node and the destination
node share during route discovery.

•

The link identifiers/secret key shared between any
two one hop nodes.

After certain period of time the same keys are used
instead of generating a set of new keys each time. As
generating keys is expensive, the overhead of this
operation can be reduced by caching. Also, if the
communication takes place between the same source
and destination, using the same privD and pubD keys
after a considerable time with a certain probability (ε>0
of one out of every few establishments between the
same source and destination) definitely helps in cutting
down on energy consumption.
The hash function generated during data
transmission phase can also be cached and reused later
for some other destination. This alleviates the burden on
the source as it need not compute new hash functions
each time it has to send data.
H. Minimum Threshold Energy
Every node in the network has a minimum battery
protection threshold energy defined. Unlike other
routing protocols in which a node is used till the time it
dies or goes out of energy, in our protocol a node whose
energy level becomes equal to e_thresh will stop
forwarding packets to all other nodes. It will use this left
energy to perform its internal computations and also act
as a source if it wants. But as mentioned it will discard
any RREQ, RREP or data packets that are received on
behalf of other nodes. If the environment where the
network is established supports charging of the nodes
(as in using batteries or solar cells etc.) then the node
can again be active and accept packets when its energy
level goes up the defined e_thresh.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
A. Anonymity
This protocol provides a high level of sender,
receiver and intermediate node anonymity. Nodes inside
the network will not be able to determine whether the
node they received a message from is the source of this
message or forwarding it, nor will the nodes be able to
examine the messages that they forward. The sender and
receiver anonymity is achieved due to the secret key
shared between the source and the destination which no
other node would know of. Public keys in the route
discovery phase are self-generated at each node on persession basis, so that adversaries cannot link them to
real identities over time. Padding and random ttl
techniques have been applied to prevent nodes in the
network to discover the hop distance by message coding
and message volume analysis.
This protocol uses multipath routing, which diverts
the data flow and makes the traffic analysis based
detection more difficult. A comparison with three other
protocols namely ANODR, MASK, CMMBCR has
been provided in Table II. It can be observed that the
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proposed protocol provides anonymity for all nodes as
well as the data in the network with an aim to reduce the
energy consumption to a certain extent.
Characteristic

ANODR

MASK

CMMBCR

SMART

Sender
Anonymity
Receiver
Anonymity
Forwarding
node
anonymity
Key Caching
Residual
energy

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No
No

No
No

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

requires rediscovering a path. In order to provide
efficient identity, location and route anonymity along
with transfer of data securely we use multiple routes and
Shamir’s (k, n) methodology to split data and achieve
data security. In addition key caching is used and a
lower threshold energy value (e_thresh) is defined
which help strike a balance between anonymity and
energy consumption. Clearly, the protocol improves
reliability along with prolongation of lifetime of the
network. As future work we will find the efficiency of
the proposed protocol in comparison to other secure and
anonymous routing protocols using NS-2 simulator.
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TABLE II: Comparison
A. Message Compromising
A share is compromised if it is relayed by a
compromised node. If k shares are compromised, it
implies that the message too is determined since the
knowledge of k or more pieces is sufficient to construct
the message. This protocol requires encrypting the
shares that are transmitted. So if the attacker wants to
compromise a message, enough shares (at least k) must
be intercepted and then decrypted.
B. Security Analysis
The proposed routing protocol is secure against
some of the most common passive and active attacks in
MANETs like replay attack, identity spoofing,
eavesdropping. In this protocol, RREQ message
trapdoor contains a public key related pseudonym so
that the destination is able to verify the integrity of the
message. The protocol does not use real identity for
routing and data transmission, however adversary can
disguise as an intermediate node in the route. This
protocol thwarts such type of attacks as the pseudonyms
are linked to public key, and the corresponding private
key is only known to the node that first announces the
pseudonym. The RREP messages are encrypted in onion
like structure. An adversary can insert itself in a route;
nevertheless, without all keys of the entire route, it is
impossible to reveal the real content of the message. In
addition, the use of Shamir’s secret sharing technique
renders the data secure.
V. CONCLUSION
Conventional routing protocols in wireless network
are based on single path. Any event such as link
breakage causing invalidation of the path results in
failure of the entire routing path, has lesser reliability
and consumes a lot of energy since the source node
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